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ABSTRACT
The authors investigated the effectiveness of incentive
contracts as a tool to motivate contractors. They also studied
several motivational theories to determine the feasibility of
combining other motivational methods with incentive contracts.
The interview technique was used to determine the effec-
tiveness of incentive contracts and the conclusions drawn led
the authors to believe that motivational procedures could be
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Government procurement is an extremely complex discipline
involving many detailed areas. In their investigation of this
subject, the authors concentrated on incentive contracts, a
small portion of the procurement process. The primary objec-
tive of this thesis was to determine the effectiveness of
incentive contracts as motivators for government contractors.
A secondary objective was to examine the usefulness of moti-
vational theorists' methods in incentive contracting. In
the event that such motivational theories proved fruitful,
the authors intended to recommend refinements to the incentive
contracting process.
B. BACKGROUND
In FY 1972, the United States Government spent approxi-
mately fifty-six billion dollars in procuring goods and
services to run current programs. The majority of this
amount was in connection with national defense which totaled
213.5 billion dollars in the Navy alone. This procurement
Judson, R., Deputy Director of the Commission on Govern-
ment Procurement, Address at the Naval Postgraduate School,
18 July 1973.
2 Survey of Procurement Statistics
,
p. 2, Department of
the Navy Headquarters Naval Material Command, June 1972.

spending is astronomical when compared to the 15 billion
dollar total defense budget of the late 19^0' s. Though
there have been budget cutbacks in recent years, there has
been an annual increase of the dollar amount allocated for
defense spending. While the dollar amount has increased, the
defense portion as a percentage of the annual budget has
h
declined from 40 . 8% in FY 1970, to 31.8$ in FY 1973- The
real problem has been that this decrease has resulted in
fewer weapon systems procured with higher cost per system,
at a time when more systems are needed. Congress has continued
to observe these procurements with dissatisfaction as these
costs have increased and has emphasized that the government
cannot continue to operate its defense policy with these
astronomical procurement costs. There has been evidence that
DOD has needed to tighten its spending and management control
and yet costs have continued to rise.
1 . Review of Contracting and Procurement Procedures
Inflation can be blamed for part of this increased
procurement cost, but the authors feel that more direct causes
have been the "gold-plating" and inefficient procurement
practices. Gold-plated items are nice to have features which
are unnecessary for the performance of the intended mission
J Halperin, M. H. , "The Evolution of American Military
Strategy," in Smith, M. E.
,




p. 176, The Johns Hopkins
Press, 196b.
4 The Budget of the United States Government Fiscal Year
1973 a P« 75, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
1972.

of the weapon system. Admiral Kidd, Chief of Naval Material,
has voiced his opinion on numerous occasions that weapon
systems which are effective, of simple design, easily main-
5tainable, and highly reliable are needed. These sentiments
have been reiterated by many other individuals throughout
the government, with well-founded concern.
The government has needed to write contracts which
result in systems which meet mission specifications and yet
cost less. To accomplish this, the contractor must be encour-
aged to become more efficient. The government must ensure
that there is less "gold-plating" and that the product which
the government desires is developed at less cost. Efficiency
will become a greater must in the future.
While many government personnel have recognized that
efficiency has become a necessity, not enough has been done
to improve, with the result that DOD procurement has become
the center of much criticism. Certainly DOD has not done
any worse job of procurement than other government agencies,
but since it has spent the most, it has naturally been in the
spotlight. DOD has had its resident critics who have attacked
5 Kidd, I. C, Jr., Chief of Naval Material, "The Three R's:
Reliability, Responsibility, and Reason," address to the Naval
Air Systems Command's Monthly Luncheon, Fort Myer Officer's
Club, 16 February 1972, Readings in Acquisition Management for
Period of 1969 to 1972 , Compiled by CDR DeMayo , P., pp. 603-622,
Naval Postgraduate School Print Shop, June 1972.
Bell, H. , Deputy Director Procurement and System Acquisi-
tion Division GAO, Address at the Naval Postgraduate School,
December 1972.

the problems of existing procurement policies, criticizing
the manner in which procurement has been handled, but have
proposed no real solutions.
Members of Congress have criticized DOD procurement
policy. Their views have been against the expenditure of
funds in many phases of procurement with their main concern
being overruns. Naturally, when overruns have been aired
—
whether due to inflation or otherwise—the news created has
resulted in criticism of DOD. Little if any of this criticism
has been constructive and, unfortunately, the net result has
been such an elaborate system of checks and balances that
Project Managers spend an inordinate amount of time appeasing
this bureaucratic might and cutting red tape. Defense against
outside criticism has become a way of life within DOD, and
has sapped efforts to alleviate the real problem of ineffi-
ciency in procurement practices.
The Congress has been so concerned with procurement
problems that in 1969 it created a Congressional Commission
on Government Procurement. The report by this commission
has recently been completed.
The Commission on Government Procurement was created
by Public Law 19-129 in November 1969 to study and recom-
mend to Congress methods "to promote the economy, effi-
ciency, and effectiveness" of procurement by the executive
branch of the Federal Government. The products of more
than a year's intensive work by the study groups were pre-
sented to the Commission in reports totaling more than
15,000 pages and 1^9 recommendations.
7 Commission on Government Procurement, Summary of the
Report of the Commission on Government Procurement
, pp. Ill- IV,
U. S. Government Printing Office, December 1972.
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As indicated in the Report of the Commission on
Government Procurement, many new schemes, particularly in
the contracting area, have had their rise and fall. It has
also been customary to institute change when new personnel
assume positions in DOD. The attempt has been to provide
new guidelines when the old ones haven't even been fully
o
understood. Every new head seems to have had the illusion
that he must make a name for himself and therefore changes
existing policy. There is nothing wrong with changing a poor
system to improve it, but all too often change has occured
without adequate consideration of what was indeed wrong with
the old system.
Contracting has undergone several changes during the
past ten years. Total Package Procurement (TPP)--one contract
for both development and production—which saw its major down-
fall with the C-5A, has been out of vogue for several years,
although the original concept of preventing "buy-ins" seemed
good. Original contracting schemes visualized two extremes,
the firm fixed price (FFP) at one end and the cost plus fixed
fee (CPPF) at the other end. The FFP type contract has
placed the entire burden of risk on the contractor, whereas
the CPFF contract has placed the entire burden of risk on
the government. Though these types of contracts have had
o
Frosch, R. A., Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research and Development, Address at the Sixteenth Annual
Institute on Government Contracts, George Washington Univer-
sity/Federal Ear Association, Washington, D. C., 8 May 1969,
Readings in Acquisition Management for Period of 1969-1972
,
Compiled by CDR DeMayo, P., pp. 325-3^5, Naval Postgraduate
School Print Shop, June 1972.

their place, between them a myriad of other contracts have
sprung up which have included fixed price plus incentive
fee (FPI) and cost plus incentive fee (CPIF). In DOD direc-
tive 5000.1, the government made progress by attempting to
fit the appropriate type of contract to the procurement phase.
Essentially this meant breaking the procurement into (1)
a development contract whereby a cost-incentive contract
should be used and, (2) a production contract which should
usually be a fixed price contract. Rare has been the case
when the development contractor has not been awarded the
production contract. Thus contracting has proceeded from
the "buy-ins" to TPP to a two stage TPP where the contractor
"buys-in" during the development phase and gets well during
the production phase. The latest in contractual development
has been the Award Pee which has attempted to provide the
Contractor with timely reinforcement based upon some pre-
determined achievement. How effective the Award Fee will
be is yet to be determined, but the prospects appear bright.
2 . Incentives and Incentive Contracts
The authors have begun by focusing on contracting,
and before being accused of being resident critics, will
continue into incentive contracts, after a brief statement
of why they became interested in this subject area.
As students in the System Acquisition Management cur-
riculum, the authors have had many opportunities to study
the preceeding ideas. Their interest was particularly aroused
by the views of the Honorable Robert A. Frosch. The following
excerpt taken from his address at the sixteenth annual Institute
10

on Government Contracts, May 8, 19^9 a was perhaps a major
stimulus for this thesis.
Now I come to incentives. Do we really know what it
is we are incentivizing when we write an incentive? In-
centives are statements to the contractor that say that if
you are a good boy and do well on the difficult parts you
get more money, and if you do badly you get less money,
and in the end, you may, in fact, lose your shirt (depending
on how the contract is construed).
The thing that worries me about incentives is that
we are assuming that incentives are identical to motivation,
and that, in fact, by adjusting the dollar values of in-
centives, we have very fine control over the motivations
of the people who are actually doing the job. I don't
know of any direct experimental evidence that suggests
that this is really right and I doubt it . It is almost
certainly not right down to the level of fine control. I
think we ought to find out more about it. I think it
would be very useful to try and find out exactly what the
effects of certain incentives are, not on the overall
performance of the contract, but on what actually happens
inside the manufacturer. The probable effect of incentives
on the manufacturing company is to give it a rather more
complicated framework inside which it can optimize its
problems. If we are not very careful about putting in
the incentives, the manufacturer may very well be moti-
vated to do the wrong thing. He wants to operate in
the incentive structure to maximize profit. We want him
to operate in the incentive structure to produce an object
which is most like our desires. The two are not necessarily
the same thing."
With this statement as the seed, the authors pursued
other articles, case studies, and queried numerous individuals
in an attempt to ascertain the validity of Dr. Frosch's views
on this matter.
With this background the focus has narrowed down to
incentive contracts. Perhaps the most widely accepted reasons






(1) Incentive contracts promote efficiency since
they are intended to encourage the profit-minded contractor
to cut costs in order to make a greater profit, and since
the government saves a portion (depending on the share ratio
—
percent of cost shared by government/contractor, e.g., 90/10)
of every dollar below target cost, both will benefit.
(2) Incentive contracts are implicitly intended to
be a means of risk sharing. With a firm fixed price contract,
the contractor has all of the risk, which is good for the
government. Under a cost plus fixed fee contract, the govern-
ment has all the risk. The fixed price incentive fee contract
and cost plus incentive fee contract have provided a wider
range of alternatives and varied degrees of risk to each
party.
The effectiveness of incentives has been the big
question. Dr. Frosch has questioned this fact , and statis-
tical studies by the Rand Corporation and by Commander Max
12Dixon , to mention two, have shown no conclusive evidence
that incentives have been effective or that incentives even
accomplish what they were intended. As Professor Raymond G.
Hunt, Professor of Psychology, State University of New York
Ibid .
.
Rand Corporation Report RM-5120-PR, Cost Incentives and
Contract Outcomes: an Impirical Analysis , by Fisher, I. N.
,
September 19bb.
12 CDR Dixon, M. W. , A Statistical Analysis of Deviations
from Target Cost in NAVAIRSYSCQMHQ Fixed-Price Incentive Con-
tracts During the 19^9-1965 Time Frame
,
iM~ S. Thesis, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, March 1973.
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at Buffalo, has indicated, perhaps incentives have been misnomers
and should have been called variable profit with the CPFF being
Is
a special case where the variable profit has been fixed.
To arm themselves for the research effort, the authors
studied numerous psychological theories concerning incentives
as motivators. With these theories as a basis, the authors
formed their preliminary opinions, namely: one, that the
incentives used should motivate a contractor to do a better
job, and, two, that the contractor should treat incentive
contracts differently than fixed price contracts.
3 . Motivational Theories
Since Elton Mayo conducted studies at the Hawthorne
Works (Chicago) of the Western Electric Company (1927-1932),
14giving the human relations school its start, almost everyone
has jumped on the motivation band wagon. The theories are
plentiful and many are appealing.
There is widespread agreement among the theorists
that incentives do not, in fact, motivate , but rather they
move an individual to act a certain way. One source pointed
out that to a manager the difference is purely academic. The
general consensus was, however, that when an employer offers
1?J Hunt, R. G., "Extra-Contractual Incentives in the Award
Fee," Address at the School of System and Logistics Air Force
Institute of Technology Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, 23-24
February 1972, Proceedings POD Procurement Symposium: Progress
and Research in the Seventies
,
p. 75-110, February 1972.
] 4 Wassenaar, D. J. and Oestreich, H. H. , The Hawthorne
Studies, A Summary and Critical Evaluation , San Jose State




financial inducements to his employees, he is trying to
change the employee's behavior, i.e., he is trying to teach
15him a new habit.
A few of the most widely accepted behavior theories
will be discussed now.
a. A. H. Maslow 16
Maslow looked at the needs of an individual and
contended that man attempts to satisfy needs in the following
ascending (1 to 5) order:
(1) Physical needs (food and water)
(2) Safety needs (shelter, threat on or off the job)
(3) Social needs (need to associate, to belong)
(4) Egotistic needs (to obtain respect)
(5) Self-actualization (the desire to become everything
that one is capable of becoming)
17
b. Frederick Herzberg
Herzberg' s satisfier/dissatisf ier theory is widely
recognized and practiced. In short, Herzberg claims that the
many factors which affect workers' attitudes can be divided
into two groups. The satisfiers are those factors which promote
feelings of job satisfaction and include such things as recog-
nition, achievement, work itself, responsibility, possibility
15 Rothe, H. F., "Does Higher Pay Bring Higher Productivity?"
in Sutermeister , R. A. (ed.), People and Productivity
,
p. 257-
265, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. , 1963.
Wallace, J., Psychology: A Social Science
,
p. 108,
W. B. Saunders Company, 1971*
17 Herzberg, F., Mausner, B., and Snyderman, B. B.,
"Motivation Versus Hygiene" in Sutermeister, R. A. (ed.),
People and Productivity
,




of growth, and advancement. The dissatisfiers are those
factors that do not by themselves promote job satisfaction,
but if not present, they can lead to job dissatisfaction.
They include such factors as pay, steady employment, early




Vroom' s theory is most attractive to the authors.
He contends that the strength of a person's desire or aversion
for "something" is based not on its intrinsic properties, but
on the anticipated satisfaction or dissatisfaction associated
with other outcomes to which they are expected to lead. That
is to say, means acquire attractiveness as a consequence of
their expected relationships to ends.
d. J. W. Atkinson
Atkinson's risk-taking theory falls close to the
behavioral theory of Vroom in the authors' opinion. He con-
tends that risk-taking involves a motive, an expectancy, and
an incentive. Instead of attaching positive or negative
valences to an outcome, Atkinson speaks of motivation to
succeed and motivation to avoid failure, which essentially
boil down to the same thing as positive or negative valences.
-i o
' Vroom, V. H. , Work and Motivation, p. 14-28, John Wiley
& Sons, Inc. , 1967-
19 Wallace , J
.
,
W. B. Saunders Company, 1971-





Helen Peak, in an article entitled "Attitude and
Motivation," pointed out that there is no limit to the environ-
mental variables that might be used to change attitudes. She
said
:
To change attitudes we must remember the chemist who
would not think of using the same reagent in order to alter
the structure of a molecule of sodium chloride as he would
to change a protein molecule. We too need to refine our
reagents and select them in the light of the structure with
which we are working. 21
Not long after Hawthorne, Chester Barnard, the Presi-
dent of the New Jersey Bell Telephone Company, wrote a book
which set forth his belief that any organization secures the
22
services of its employees by the incentives it offers them.
The incentives that have received the greatest emphasis are
the material inducements since they are easiest to produce
and therefore offer. In I960, Harold Rothe wrote an article
entitled "Does Higher Pay Bring Higher Productivity?" At that
time, in practically all companies, the preferred method of
inducing employees to work faster, or better, or both, was to
2?
offer them more money.
20 Peak, H. , "Attitude and Motivation," in Cummings, L. L
and Scott, W. E., Jr., Readings in Organizational Behavior
and Human Performance
,
p~^ 159-166, Richard D. Irwin, Inc.,
and the Dorsey Press, 1969
.
21 Ibid . .
22 Dowling, W. P., Jr. and Sayles, L. R., How Managers











Incentive systems are recorded as having been used as
early as 400 B. C. by the Chaldeans and probably by the Romans
24in the first century A. D.. There is remarkably little
experimental evidence to prove that incentive systems of any
type actually work. Labor unions claim that their use is
declining, but as of 1963, from 25 - 30% of workers in U. S.
25industry were estimated to be covered by incentives. In
the United Kingdom, 42% of wage earners were on "payment by
results" in 1961.
24 Sills, D. L. (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the
Social Sciences , v. 7, p. 248-249, Macmillan, 1968.
25 Ibid .
.
26 TK .,Ibid . .
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II. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
The existence of two distinctive types of contracts has
generally been recognized. On one end of the spectrum has
been the firm fixed price contract and on the other end has
27been the cost plus type of contract. With fixed price con-
tracts, the fee has been determined as the difference between
cost to produce an item and the agreed price. The burden has
generally been on the Contractor under this type of contract
to keep cost as low as possible in order to earn as much fee
as possible. A modification to this type of contract has
resulted in the fixed price plus incentive fee contract which
has combined the features of cost-price differential and some
fee called an incentive. The other distinctive contract type,
cost plus, places the Government in a somewhat disadvantaged
position. The Government pays for the development and pro-
duction cost, until they greatly exceed target cost, and
then awards the contractor an "incentive fee" in accordance
with a pre-arranged scheme upon completion of the work. The
"incentive fee" is variable in the PPI and CPIF cases with a
more specific case being the cost plus fixed fee where the
fee is fixed. Thus a more accurate description of our so-called
27 Harbridge House Inc
.
, Basic Graphics for Incentive
Contracting
,
p. 1, Harbridge House Inc..
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"incentive contracts" would be "variable fee contracts." Just
from the name "incentive contract," one can easily be trapped
into expecting something special to result from its use.
Robert S. Opsahl and Marvin D. Dunnette in their article,
"The Role of Financial Compensation in Industrial Motivation,"
have defined incentive as "an object or external condition,
perceived as capable of satisfying an aroused motive, that
po
tends to elicit action to ootain the object or condition."
Used in this context, incentive contracts have had the impli-
cation of being motivators to contractors. That is, contractors
given an incentive type contract are motivated to do a better
job and gain some incentive. At first glance, this should
appear logical. Given a 70/30 share line on an incentive
type contract, a contractor would be expected to cut cost
below target cost since he would receive 30 cents on every
dollar saved. Upon closer scrutiny, it can be shown that a
contractor might be motivated to purchase new equipment and
allocate that cost to the current government contract where
the government will pay 70 cents of every dollar that the new
equipment costs (assuming the contractor can convince the
government that the equipment is necessary for the existing
project). There has also been the claim that contractors
purposely indicate a high target cost in order to enhance the
Opsahl, R. S. and Dunnette, M. D., "The Role of Financial
Compensation in Industrial Motivation," in Cummings, L. L. and
Scott j W. E. , Jr., Readings in Organizational Behavior and
Human Performance
,
~p~. 499-527 , Richard D. Irwin, Inc . , and
the Dorsey Press, 1969.
19

chance of a large fee. The preceding views are based upon
the assumption that all contractors are profit motivated.
Generally, it has become an accepted fact that all com-
panies have been profit motivated in the long run just for
existence. Short run company objectives, however, can vary
in as many ways as there are companies. Thus, in the short
run, contractors have bid on government contracts with the
single purpose of contributing to National Defense and have
disregarded any possible profit that could be earned on the
contract. The contractor may have performed superbly with
the underlying purpose of acquiring future government con-
tracts. In this case, the true incentive was the acquisition
of future contracts and not the possible profit that could
have been earned during the current contract. From this hypo-
thetical case, the question has arisen, given an incentive
contract, have contractors been motivated by the monetary
incentive which the government has offered? Taking the Incen-
tive offered by the government one step further, does the
contractor attempt to do anything with this incentive to
motivate his personnel to perform better?
Typical cases might be described indicating that profit
is not the only incentive present in government contracts
and, in fact, the incentive fee is only a true incentive
when the short-run objective of a company is profit maximization.
The preceding discussion in essence asks the question,
is money the best incentive to offer the contractor and likewise,
is it the best incentive for a contractor to offer his personnel?
20

Several statistical analyses have been conducted with
regards to incentive contracts, but results of these studies
are contradictory. After an in depth analysis of deviation
from target cost in Naval Air Systems Command Headquarters
(NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ) , fixed-price incentive contracts during
the 19^9-1965 time frame, Max Wayne Dixon concluded, "It
would seem prudent, lacking supportive evidence, to not
place such dependence on incentive contracting to influence
29
efficient contractor performance." While the authors cannot
support their opinion, they believe that statistical analysis
of incentive contracts fall into the same trap as do the
similar studies of individual incentive systems. The individual
incentive systems also lack supportive statistical evidence
that they work, but many of the individual incentive systems
fail because of improper implementation and not because of
30the shortcoming of the incentive. At lower levels in a
company, there is no reason why a monetary incentive should
not work.
It seems likely that much of the "negative data" associated
with incentive contracts are due to improper use of the tool
rather than to having a faulty tool.
If Maslow's need hierarchy theory is accepted, the five
need levels described by Maslow can be roughly correlated with
oqy Dixon, A Statistical Analysis of Deviation from Target
Cost in NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ Fixed-Price Incentive Contracts During
the 1949-1965 Time Frame
,
op. cit., p. 51.
OQ





31the individuals in the various levels of an organization.
The blue-collar labor force of a company is concerned with
fulfilling the physiological and security needs. This means
their main concerns are with food, clothing, shelter, and
security for themselves and their families. At this level,
monetary incentives would seem to be useful in order for
these people to satisfy their needs. Moving upward in an
organization, for most people pay remains of key importance
—
up to a certain dollar amount. However, needs become more
^2
oriented toward other things such as job satisfaction.
The source of job satisfaction tends to shift to the work
itself, and the need for respect and recognition by fellow
employees. Project managers who have spoken at the Naval
Postgraduate School have emphasized that they feel their main
satisfaction comes from the challenge of the position, the
esteem, and the recognition by peers and executives alike
that they have done a good job. To many, this has seemed to
be more important than the pay itself. To managers at the
top level of a company, respect and recognition have remained
important. However, self-actualization, that is, becoming
everything that one is capable of becoming, has become the
true incentive. At this level, for most persons, the basic
needs have long been submerged and these higher needs provide
31
„Porter, L. W. and Lawler, E. E. , III, "Properties of
Organization Structure in Relation to Job Attitudes and Job
Behavior ," in Cummings, L. L. and Scott, W. E., Jr., Readings
in Organizational Behavior and Human Performance
,
p . 402-M33 »





their incentive. Just as people at various levels of organi-
zations have needs which motivate them, organizations have
needs which motivate them. These needs vary from organization
to organization and, indeed, vary for any one organization
over time.
Government aims have not necessarily always coincided
with those of government contractors, thus, what the govern-
ment perceives as an incentive to a contractor does not neces-
sarily coincide with what will actually motivate the contractor





The authors' initial approach to collect research data
with regards to the effectiveness of incentive type contracts
was, as indicated previously, primarily influenced by the
Honorable Robert Frosch. To reiterate what he viewed as
being an important point :
. . . I think it would be very useful to try and find
out exactly what the effects of certain incentives are,
not on the overall performance of the contract, but on
what actually happens inside the manufacturer . . .33
The authors felt that another statistical study comparing
target cost and target fee with actual cost and actual fee,
would simply be covering trodden ground, and as other studies
have been inconclusive, would probably serve no useful purpose
In this connection, most of the articles researched by the
authors concentrated on the individual, the group, or collec-
tive systems (see Appendix A for a brief description of these
systems), almost totally avoiding the subject of organizations
In order to test these incentive systems, it would have been
necessary to investigate the blue collar or working level of
a company. Furthermore, drawing an analogy from the authors'
Frosch, R. A., Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research and Development, Address at the Sixteenth Annual
Institute on Government Contracts, George Washington Univer-
sity/Federal Bar Association, Washington, D. C, 8 May 1969 3
Readings in Acquisition Management for Period of 1969 to 1972 ,
Compiled by CDR DeMayo , P.
,
p. 3MI, Naval Postgraduate School
Print Shop, June 1972.
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own practical experience in aviation squadrons, the Commanding
Officer of an aircraft squadron could have a "motivation
factor" of 99.5 on a 0-100 scale; however, if the maintenance
man responsible for inflating the tires is not motivated to
complete his assigned tasks, the aircraft are not going to fly,
Therefore, it is of the utmost importance in any organization
to determine what actually occurs within the organization
with regard to incentives and motivational programs. As a
result, it was decided that a close scrutiny of the motiva-
tional systems of various corporations would be the optimum
place to commence research.
As a vehicle to measure the effectiveness of various
motivational systems, the authors selected and intended to
use the Department of the Navy, Office of Civilian Manpower
Management (OCMM), motivational questionnaire (see Appendix B)
which was developed by Mr. Si Masse, Evaluation Branch, OCMM
main office, Washington, D. C., for use in evaluating govern-
ment Civil Service employees. V/ith his permission and through
his efforts, the authors intended to administer this question-
niare and have it scored at the OCMM home office with the
results returned to the authors and in turn to the evaluated
corporation. The authors hypothesized that a correlation
between the scores obtained through the use of the OCMM
questionnaire and the reputation of the subject company,
good or bad, would exist. The procedure for obtaining the
company's reputation would be a combination of statistical
studies of past performance on government contracts and
extensive interviews with Defense Contract Administration
25

Services (DCAS) personnel in addition to any other informa-
tion deemed significant or necessary to make such a subjective
determination. The authors envisioned successful substantia-
tion of their hypothesis and planned to follow with a recom-
mendation for development of an instruction similar in nature
to DOD INST 7000.2, but dealing with motivational programs.
There was the realization that such an instruction would, of
course, require periodic administration of the OCMM question-
naire for a company to maintain its verification as having an
effective employee motivational environment. It was felt
that a work force scoring high on the OCMM questionnaire would
render better all around contract performance for the government
B. FAILURE OF THE INITIAL APPROACH
With this initial approach, the authors' primary concern
had been the problem of obtaining the questionnaire itself.
As indicated previously, Mr. Masse solved the problem of
permission to use the questionnaire. The questionnaire was
obtained through the extensive and much appreciated cooper-
ation of Mr. Donald West, Regional Office of Civilian Manpower
Management, San Francisco, California. Interviews with Defense
Contract Administration Service personnel offered no opposition
to this research approach. The final link, however, of actual
administration of the questionnaire proved to be the stumbling
block. The authors had selected a corporation with a good
reputation as the first sample. After thorough discussion
of the minute details of questionnaire administration, satis-
factory arrangements were made. The real problem came when
26

the questionnaire was discussed at the corporate level where
the question arose, "If the results of this questionnaire
make us look bad, can these data possibly be used against us
in future government contract awards?" Although the authors
assured the corporation that it would not be connected in
any way with the data and that the answer sheets would be
destroyed following the compilation of the data, the climate
was suddenly altered. Instead of being treated as two thesis
students, the authors were now treated as "the government"
and the corporation assumed the role of "contractor." The
authors' proposal, and, indeed, they themselves, could no
longer be trusted. The authors feel that "trust" between
the government and contractors could be the topic for an
entire thesis and thus will not be discussed in this composi-
tion. Suffice it to say, that the questionnaire was not
administered and that this air of distrust was one of the'
major reasons for the failure of this initial approach.
The second type of failure indicated two shortcomings which
will be discussed here, although the authors recognize that
others may exist. The first shortcoming hinges on the engage-
ment/involvement question. Prior to commencing the research
effort, the authors had listened to several guest lecturers
at the Naval Postgraduate School who indicated that in order
for the government to get what it desired, it must motivate
the head of the corporation and let him be concerned with the
motivation of his managers and work force within the corpora-
tion. The authors recognized that such an approach had, in
fact, been the intent of the government up to the present
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time, but felt that this approach is not necessarily the only
way or the best way to accomplish the objective of successful
contract completion. After considerable thought and discus-
sion, the authors now feel that the OCMM questionnaire
administration approach would have, in fact, resulted in too
much involvement in corporate affairs.
The second shortcoming falls into a category which the
authors have termed as "defeating the purpose." It has long
been recognized that government contractors have generally
done their best to give the government whatever the contractor
has perceived that the government wants, as the contractors
have wanted to stay in the government's good graces. There
is little doubt that the initial approach would create in
the government contractors the perception that what the
government wants is more emphasis on motivation. The results
of such an increased motivational program effort on the part
of a contractor which was encouraged by the government would
very likely result in increased cost to the government due
to greater overhead costs.
C. FINAL APPROACH
At the outset, the authors were surprised to find that
the incentive fees associated with government contracts were
not further allocated to all levels within corporations. With
this startling fact, they felt that it would be interesting




In keeping with the initial theme, "what happens inside the
corporation," the authors felt that several other questions
were extremely pertinent.
(1) What sort of motivational programs are used by various
corporations?
(2) Do these programs differ greatly from corporation to
corporation?
(3) Who sounds the alarm when a certain project is rapidly
approaching and will apparently surpass target cost?
(4) Is there a conscientious program of trade-offs designed
to maximize profit?
(5) What gives the corporation project manager the greatest
amount of satisfaction? In other words, what motivates him?
(6) Does a different type of contract warrant different
treatment from the corporation's point of view or are all
contracts administered alike internally?
By this point in their research effort, the authors were
somewhat skeptical of placing all of their faith in a question-
naire, having experienced prior failure in implementing the
use of such a vehicle, and, therefore, decided to utilize the
interview technique. This approach allowed the authors to
consider the amplifying remarks made during such interviews.
This technique also allowed the researchers to take full
advantage of the Systems Acquisition Management Seminar program
at the Naval Postgraduate School. The authors were able to
query several high ranking civilian procurement specialists,
heads of corporations, as well as some very successful project
managers from both civilian corporations and from government
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projects. In addition, several corporations were visited
where interviews were conducted v/ith project managers, con-
trollers, industrial relations managers, and contract officers.
The results of these interviews, in addition to conditions
observed in the various corporations, have served as the basis
for data collected and upon which the authors' recommendations
and conclusions were formulated.
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IV. PRESENTATION OF DATA
A. INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS
In the collection of data through interviews, specific
names and dates were kept; however, it was determined that
for the purposes of this thesis, the individuals' names as
well as the names of the corporations were usually not
pertinent. In some cases, answers were sensitive and revealing
the names could result in hardship for the individual.
The data will be presented by a statement of the question
with the individual's responses following. A section of
amplifying comments will then conclude the data section.
Thirty-five persons were interviewed from seven companies,
the Government Accounting Office, Armed Services Procurement
Regulations Committee, Commission on Government Procurement,
Navy Project Managers, and Naval Postgraduate School Faculty.
Interviews lasted from thirty minutes to four hours. After
the first few interviews, the authors found that not every
question was pertinent to every individual's job, thus only
those questions which were pertinent to the individual being
interviewed were asked. As a result, not every question will
be followed by the same number of responses, but each response
will be identified by the individual (1, 2, 3, • • •)> the
individual's organization (A, B, C, . . .), the individual's




1. Are incentives from incentive contracts passed down
to lower levels (blue collar) in the organization?
INDIVIDUAL COMPANY POSITION RESPONSE
1 A Industrial Relations NO
2 A Industrial Relations NO
3 A Contract Officer NO
5 E President NO
6 B Project Manager NO
7 B Project Manager NO
8 B Contract Officer NO
9 B Contract Officer NO
10 B Controller NO
11 B Controller NO
12 C Industrial Relations NO
13 C Training NO
14 C Controller NO
15 C Controller NO
16 'C Contract Officer NO
17 C Contract Officer NO
18 C Vice President,
Development
NO
19 GAO Director Military Acq. NO
20 D Contract Officer NO
21 * Deputy Director NO
22 ** Contract Officer NO
23 USN Navy Project Manager NO
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INDIVIDUAL COMPANY POSITION RESPONSE
24 x*# Instructor NO
25 *** Instructor NO
26 USN Navy Project Manager NO
27 F President NO
29 USN Chairman, Aspr C ommitt ee NO
* Commission on Government Procurement
** Navy Regional Procurement Office , Los Angeles
*** United States Air Force Academy
2. Who sounds the alarm if a project is about to encounter
a cost overrun?
POSITION RESPONSE
Industrial Relations NO RESPONSE
Industrial Relations NO RESPONSE
Contract Officer Project Manager
Project Manager Project Manager
Project Manager Project Manager
Contract Officer NO RESPONSE





Contract Officer Project Manager
Deputy Director Project Manager
Navy Project Manager Project Manager
Navy Project Manager Project Manager





















INDIVIDUAL COMPANY POSITION RESPONSE
30 C Project Manager
* Commission on Government Procurement
Project Manager
3. Is there a conscientious program of trade-offs designed











































4 . Does a different type of contract warrant different
attention, or are all contracts treated in a similar manner
administratively?
INDIVIDUAL COMPANY POSITION RESPONSE
3 A Contract Officer ALL SAME
6 B Project Manager ALL SAME





Contract Officer ALL SAME





Contract Officer ALL SAME
Contract Officer ALL SAME
Deputy Director ALL SAME
Contract Officer ALL SAME
Navy Project Manager ALL SAME
Navy Project Manager ALL SAME
Chairman, Aspr ALL SAME
Committee
* Commission on Government Procurement
** Navy Regional Procurement Office, Los Angeles
5. What do you consider the best incentive or motivator















































6. What gives the Corporation Project Manager the greatest
amount of satisfaction, in other words what motivates him?




a. Individual 6, Company B, Project Manager, response:
Of course pay and promotions are important, but the real
driving force is the personal satisfaction that I have done a
good job. Even if I bring a project in over target cost, but
know that I have done as well as possible, I am still person-
ally satisfied.
b. Individual 7 9 Company B, Project Manager, response:
In my opinion, all good Project Managers are egotists. The
pay, promotions and other benefits will automatically follow
if I satisfy myself. After all I know more about what is
important than my superiors.
c. Individual 23, USN, Navy Project Manager, response:
Job satisfaction.
d. Individual 26, USN, Navy Project Manager, response:
Personal pride. If you strive to attain the capability to
be able to beat someone like yourself, you will never have
any problems, because you are the best.
e. Individual 30, Company C, Project Manager, response:
There are easier jobs with the same or even better pay, but
few offer the rewards associated with being a successful Project
Manager.
f. Individual 31, USN, Navy Project Manager, response:
This is my final tour and I have attempted to do a good job
for my personal satisfaction.
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7. Other pertinent comments.
a. Individual 1, Company A, Internal Relations,
Comments: Psychological theories are tremendous in theory,
but when put to use in the real world seem to have problems.
Incentive systems run into problems with the unions who tend
to strive for mediocrity. For now, union personnel advance-
ment depends upon performance, and individuals are reported
on depending on how well they are doing.
b. Individual 3, Company A, Contract Officer, Comments:
The incentive offered by the government is viewed as profit,
and is not passed down to the individuals within the corpora-
tion.
c. Individual 5> Company E, President, Comments:
With government contracts there is too much written reporting
and not enough physical involvement. We, the contractor, will
still run our business to make money and companies can make
money if they are efficient. In fact, there is opportunity
to make good money even with all the emphasis on restricting
profit. A FPI contract with a 75/25 or a 85/15 share ratio
is not a very good incentive and if the contractor sees an
underrun, he will spend to build himself up. Motivators
include promotions, training programs, and incentive plans
based on profit for top management. Buy-ins will never stop
unless you let the chips fall.
d. Individual 6, Company B, Project Manager, Comments:
The best incentive for the blue collar worker is good pay,
closely followed by the personal interest of high ranking
officials of the organization. He indicated that a walk
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through the working areas of the company by the company
president was one of the better incentives. He personally
used the letter-of-appreciation approach to recognize and,
therefore, foster continued superior performance. He felt
that incentives, from the government's point of view, was
nothing more than insurance that the company would perform.
He stressed the importance of not losing the entire schedule
at one time and then suggested that the government might try
incentivizing its own people. He indicated that he knew
when impending overruns were present before others in the
corporation. He was not aware of any conscientious program
of profit maximization through trade-offs on a corporate
level; however, he felt that profit was a corporate goal and,
therefore, was concerned with profit maximization at the
project level. At this level, with the aid of an assigned
controller assistant, he was aware of the impact of trade-off
decisions on profit and thus acted accordingly. He went on
to assert that award fee contracts increase the contractor's
willingness to talk to the customer. His final comment was
that the government should "incentivize" early milestones
since the first six months of a project, usually, drive the
downstream like a lever.
e. Individual 7 3 Company C, Project Manager, Comments
The detailed level of specifications cause contractors many
problems, and the fact that the government won't allow a




f. Individual 12, Company C, Industrial Relations,
Comments: What is needed is a good contract structure that
clearly lays out the objectives with good specifications.
When this company was having financial difficulties, moti-
vation was very high because everybody had a common goal,
survival
.
g. Individual 17, Company C, Contract Officer, Com-
ments: In the area of uncertainty, set a reasonably realiz-
able goal and incentivize above that level and don't punish
us if we come up short.
h. Individual 18, Company C, Vice President Develop-
ment, Comments: Deemphasize the legal jargon in contracts
and effectively communicate to the contractor what it is that
you want. Specifications for the Wright Brother's airplane
amounted to less than two pages, now specs for a plane fill
two boxcars.
i. Individual 21, Commission on Government Procure-
ment
_,
Deputy Director, Comments: If you know enough to
properly structure an incentive contract, why don't you use
a firm fixed price contract? I think incentive contracts
are used as a sort of "cop-out" when we are too lazy to do
our homework. The award fee contract looks very promising.
j . Individual 22, Navy Regional Procurement Office
Los Angeles, Contract Officer, Comments: There is no bad
type of contract, only bad usage. Cost plus award fee (CPAF)
offers a logical approach to many procurements not suitable
for fixed price, fixed price incentive, or cost plus incentive
fee situations. A well structured CPAF motivation pattern
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and good administration thereof, makes government managers
manage their contracts and brings about a contractor/govern-
ment interface relationship of a higher than otherwise level
through
:
(1) higher level of definition of performance
difficulties and problem areas;
(2) more frequent exchange of information;
(3) higher echelons of both contractor and
government become involved earlier; both informed and given
an opportunity to act;
(4) cognizant personnel of both contractor and
government organizations are brought together in a common
team effort when it is clearly understood that BOTH have the
same motivation, better performance.
k. Individual 23, USN, Navy Project Manager, Comments:
If only profit is the motive, the product will not be good.
1. Individual 32, Naval Postgraduate School, Professor,
Comments: The Production Manager is the real cost tracker.
An incentive is essentially protection. Incentives are not
essential to motivate, there are numerous other motivations;
the main thing a manager must be concerned with is that he
doesn't demotivate. Loyalty is the key and everybody is
loyal to somebody.
C. EVALUATION OF DATA
The overwhelming answer that incentives from government
contracts are definitely not passed down to personnel in
corporations seems pertinent. This fact In connection with
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the answers provided indicating that there seems to be no
profit maximization scheme on corporate levels, provide much
fruit for thought. If the incentive fee is not treated as
an incentive, but as profit, as several individuals have
indicated, and if there is no corporate, profit maximization
scheme, then the use of an incentive fee to motivate the
contractor toward better performance becomes questionable.
Since there is no profit maximization scheme on a corporate
basis, then possibly the government's thinking that all com-
panies are only profit motivated is outmoded. Perhaps the
government should look for other incentives or experiment
with new methods of applying the incentive fee which would
provide an actual incentive for a company.
The consensus of opinion was that the greatest incentive
for the working man was the paycheck, and as you go up through
the levels of the corporation, other things, such as job
satisfaction and peer approval, become more important. The
government must not become over engaged in corporate affairs,
thus providing various incentives at various levels within a
corporation is a complex task. To comply with DOD engagement
policy, it seems necessary to provide top management with an
incentive that will motivate it to in turn provide the neces-
sary incentives for lower corporate levels.
If all contracts are administered the same regardless of
type, as the data imply, then possibly the government's
attempt to provide incentive type contracts is wrong, since
they may not elicit the desired response from the contractor.
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There seems to be total agreement that the first period of a
contract , during which such things as staffing, getting the
specifications out, and getting the drawings out, is the
most important part of a contract, since it drives the per-
formance of later portions of the contract. The government
seems to recognize this fact, but really has failed to do
anything to emphasize the importance of the period.
A final recurring theme that was noted from these inter-
views as well as from numerous speakers is the need for
mutual trust between the government and contractors, and
the need for the government to provide more functional
specifications which allow the contractor more freedom to
provide what the government wants. This freedom essentially
requires trust also.
These seem to the authors to be the most important points
obtained from these interviews and questioning of various
individuals. From these data, the authors developed a pro-
posal which they think will add new life to incentive contracts





To date, the authors have been unable to satisfactorily
respond to one individual who said, "If you know enough to
properly structure an incentive contract, why don't you use
a firm fixed price contract?" One possible response might
be that there is not always* the time to eliminate enough of
the unknowns to enable one to use the firm fixed price con-
tract. In other words, one does not always know exactly
what it is that is wanted at the time of contract award.
Another individual advised that a contract should never be
signed before one knows what is wanted. It might appear
that the authors are heading toward a recommendation that the
government should do more homework. But that would not
really be a recommendation, it would only be restating a
problem. The authors realize that the procurement process
offers numerous problems and have no visions of correcting all
of them. Thus the authors have accepted the notion that
there is an appropriate time for use of an incentive contract,
and hope to follow the advice of Helen Peak, quoted earlier
as saying, "We, too, (psychologists) need to refine our
reagents and select them in light of the structure with which
we are working." The main purpose of this thesis has been
-^ Peak, "Attitude and Motivation," op. cit., p. 160
^3

to refine one reagent, the incentive contract. This refine-
ment will draw heavily upon psychological motivation theories.
B. THE REFINEMENT
The authors recommend an incentive in the form of award
fees spaced at appropriate intervals throughout the life of
the contract. These fees should be based upon the accomplish-
ment of measurable milestones.
The authors spent considerable time evaluating their pro-
posed refinement to incentive contracts from a great many
aspects. The final evaluation as to the legality was provided
by Captain L. E. Hopkins (USN), Chairman of the ASPR Committee
There is, in fact, no legal reason, according to Captain
Hopkins, why such a change could not be implemented.
Contractors and government personnel in the procurement
area recognize that the most important time period of a
contract, as far as determining success or failure, is the
first few months. If this period is so important, the authors
propose that this period be incentivized by an award fee
arrangement based upon accomplishment of measurable milestones
If you, as do the authors, accept the theory that to
motivate is to make some behavior more probable, then it is
important that certain conditions be followed. Harold F.
Rothe, in an article entitled "Does Higher Pay Bring Higher
Productivity?," indicates that the motivational process





requires that there be:
1. A motive
2. An incentive appropriate to the motive, recognized
as being related to the action, and certain of being applied
immediately as soon as the correct action has been success-
fully completed.
Current incentive contract methods do not meet all these
requirements. The authors have previously indicated that
motives are numerous. But there is a motive or the contractor
would not have bid in the first place. The authors feel that
they can improve the understanding of what is to be done and
their award fee proposal differs somewhat from the standard
award fee. Award fees are generally based on subjective
evaluation of how well the contractor has performed during
a certain time frame. The authors recommend that the award
fee be based on an objective evaluation. The proposal would
require the government to set up some identifiable goals
upon which to award this incentive at the end of the period.
Certainly, this would require the government to do its home-
work in greater detail. Requiring the government to do its
homework earlier and more thoroughly would force it together
with the contractors to determine those items which both
consider to be important. These items could then be made
into measurable milestones for objective evaluation. When
this is accomplished, both the government and the contractor
will have goals more closely aligned, and both will know
what the other expects. Alignment of goals, in the authors'
opinion, will improve the effectiveness and likelihood of
government contracting.

Is the incentive appropriate to the motive? By statute
limitations, a contractor cannot receive more than 15 percent
(of target cost) profit on research and development or 10
percent on production contracts. Dowling and Sayles contend
that money as a motivator of individuals begins with the
3720 percent increase. The authors do not think of their
proposed fee as an incentive in itself, however, and feel that
the current limits need not be altered to accomplish the
refinement of the incentive contract.
From the data presented on administration of various type
contracts, it is doubtful that the incentive is recognized
as being related to the action. However, with the objective
award fee contract, this problem could be eliminated.
Current incentive contracts do not award the incentive
immediately after the completed action in the authors' opinion.
With the time span from beginning to end of a contract being
any number of years, the action at the critical stage of the
contract is not perceived as being related to the reward
years later. The authors feel that immediate reward at the
end of the first few months is a must.
This proposal would better ensure that those items early
in a contract which the government thinks are necessary for
successful completion of the contract will be accomplished.
This, the authors feel, would require the government to deter-
mine just what items are important at this stage of the contract




Some of the items proposed by the authors are:
1. Staffing key personnel in key positions.
2. Subsystem specifications disseminated.
3. Drawings completed and released.
k. Procurements placed.
5. Experimental test completed.
From the contractors' viewpoint, this type of a structure
does several things which are both good for the Project Manager
and in turn good for the government. An award fee after the
first few months of a contract gets the attention of the
Corporate Management and would enable the Project Manager to
get the key personnel he needs and put them in the proper
positions. Corporate Management has previously looked at
contract payoffs as something far in the future, but this
would force them to look at it early. Early recognition
seemed to be very important to the Project Managers interviewed
At the project managers' level, he would have a tool which
he could use to motivate his personnel. Through interviews
the authors formulated the opinion that personnel working
on the specifications and drawings were viewed as necessary,
but in most cases, they were not made to feel that they were
a part of the project team. With this structure, the Project
Manager can show them that they are important and fulfill
some of their higher level needs such as recognition and job
satisfaction. As can be seen, this approach would provide
incentives for at least three levels within the corporation
without excessive government engagement. The main concern,
however, is that the government gets what it wants on time
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and within cost. This early portion of the contract must
be done well to ensure success in fulfilling the entire
contract
.
After this initial period, the authors propose that a
second period be incentivized by another award fee. Here
again the award fee does certain things for the government.
It allows the government to evaluate its objectives and see
if the original approach is still the desired approach or
if some other approach would be better.
This would also require the government to determine what
is important during this period of time.
From the contractors viewpoint, it provides similar con-
siderations as during the previous period. It maintains
corporate management's attention and yet allows the Project
Manager to use this as a tool to motivate those persons whose
tasks are of utmost importance during this period.
The authors feel that this method could be continued by
breaking the contract into various period and incentivizing




There is mounting evidence that the Defense Department
must tighten its belt and become more efficient if it is to
fulfill its future mission. Efficient procurement of new
weapon systems is therefore of utmost importance. Problems
in the procurement area alone have prompted the creation of
a special department within the Government Accounting Office
to monitor Defense Department system acquisitions. More
recently, the Congress has appointed a Commission on Govern-
ment Procurement tasked with recommending methods to promote
the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of procurement.
This thesis has attempted to apply motivational theory
to the refinement of one procurement tool, the incentive
contract
.
The authors recognize that weaknesses may exist in their
arguments due to the limitation of research resources and the
complexity of topic. The data here are insufficient to make
sweeping changes in contracting procedures. However, from
the limited data collected, there is strong evidence that
has led the authors to draw the following conclusions:
1. Incentives from incentive contracts are not passed
down to the various levels within a company.
2. Motivational programs do not vary greatly from com-
pany to company, the main difference being the emphasis on
elements of the motivational program. For example, Company A
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may place more emphasis on pay while Company B concentrates
more heavily on personal recognition for superior performance,
but both companies make use of both of these elements.
3. Administratively speaking, ail contracts are alike in
the eye of the contractor.
4. The corporate Project Manager is the first to know
that an overrun will occur.
5- There is not a corporate program of trade-offs designed
to maximize corporate profit, but profit maximization on the
project level is practiced.
The authors would like to see more research in this area.
If this thesis does nothing more than stimulate thought in




This thesis has looked at some of the problems that exist
in government contracting as well as several psychological
theories on motivation. The authors have attempted to show
that incentives from the contractors' and the government's
viewpoints tend not to be the same. To show this the authors
explained their approach to gathering the data necessary to
make the conclusions, and explained why they used the inter-
view technique to gather these data. After evaluating these
data, the authors made the recommendation that an objective
award fee system be set up to incentivize the contractor in
various periods of a contract. They attempted to show that
once the government and the contractor have determined what
are important milestones to be incentivized in each period,
then the government and the contractor goals may become more
congruent. When this happens, the chances of success, in




BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF INCENTIVE SYSTEMS
Incentives have been categorized into three types:
1. Individual— individual systems are of three main
types
;
a. piecework— individual receives an identical amount
for each unit of output
.
b. shared gains—he receives a proportion of the value
of his output beyond a standard amount
.
c. variable return—receives amounts per unit which
differ according to his level of output
.
2. Group—under the group system, the earnings of a group
of men, such as a work crew, are pooled and each receives a
proportion of the value of any output beyond a standard amount
for that group.
3. Collective— these systems include profit sharing,
deferred compensation bonuses, stock purchase options, etc..
^ Sills, D. L. (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the
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INSTRUCTIONS
This questionnaire is part of an evaluation of the civilian personnel program at this activity-to learn how
well it is meeting your needs in addition to the needs of the activity and whether there are areas in which
the program can be improved.
We would like to know what your experience has been with this program and how you feel about certain
aspects of your own work situation. We know no better way to do this than to ask you directly, through
a questionnaire such as this.
All that is required is that you read each statement carefully, decide how you feel about it, and mark the
block on the answer sheet that best rellccts this feeling.
You will undoubtedly agree with some of the statements, disagree with others. You will probably be un-
decided about some, or find they don't apply to your situation. If so, mark the "?" box, and go on to
the next statement. Some of the statements may not be worded exactly as you would like, or may be of
the type you would prefer to answer "sometimes yes and sometimes no." In these instances answer in
the way that expresses your feeling MOST of the time. If it's more "yes" than "no," mark "yes." If it's
more "no" than "yes," mark "no." Mark only ONE block for each statement.
All responses are VOLUNTARY and completely CONFIDENTIAL. Therefore please DO NOT SIGN
YOUR NAME. Your answer sheet together with the others from this activity will be sent to the Navy
Office of Civilian Manpower Management for processing by automated equipment. Computers will sum-
marize the answers in statistical form so individual responses can't be identified. The summaries will be
returned to your activity for analysis and appropriate action.
Wc hope you will take a personal interest-perhaps self-inteiest-in giving information to assist in improv-
ing the personnel program for Navy employees at your activity.
NOTE
Make only ONE mark for each answer.
Use ordinary pencil— No. 2 is preferred if available.
DO NOT use pen and ink, ballpoint or crayon.
Do not make any additional or stray marks on answer sheet.
In making corrections, erase COMPLETELY.
Do not fold, bend, or write in questionnaire booklet.
EXAMPLE
! 10 Y I 1 XII
Right way Wrong way Wrong way Wrong way
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Answer All Questions on This P.iye in C O I . I
Line up this bar with bar on answer sheet
|. MY SKILLS AND ABILITIES ARE BEING WELL USED IN MY PRESENT JOB
2. I HAVE REVIEWED MY JOB (POSITION) DESCRIPTION IN Till; LAST YEAR
3. THE SAME PEOPLE SEEM TO GET TUB BEST ASSIGNMENTS AND PROMOTIONS
4. I AM DOING A BETTER JOB BECAUSE OF THE TRAINING I HAVE RECEIVED AT THIS ACTIVITY
5. I AM FREE TO SUBMIT A COMPLAINT, GRIEVANCE OR APPEAL WITHOUT IT BEING HEED AGAINST ME . . .
6. RULES AND REGULATIONS 1 AM EXPECTED TO FOLLOW ARE AVAILABLE TO ME IN WRITING
7. I WOULD RATHER GO TO A UNION REPRESENTATIVE OR SOMEONE
OTHER THAN MY SUPERVISOR IF 1 HAD A COMPLAINT
8. I AM BETTER PREPARED FOR PROMOTION BECAUSE OF TRAINING I HAVE RECEIVED AT THIS ACTIVITY
9. THE QUANTITY AND QUALITY OF WORK EXPECTED FROM MINORITY
GROUP MEMBERS IS THE SAME AS FOR ALL OTHER EMPLOYEES
10. RECREATIONAL FACILITIES AND ARRANGEMENTS ARE ALL RIGHT
11. MY SUPERVISOR USUALLY C1VES ME CREDIT WHEN 1 DO A GOOD JOB
12. MY JOB (POSITION) DESCRIPTION PRETTY WELL DESCRIBES WHAT I DO
13. I GET FAIR CONSIDERATION FOR THE BETTER JOBS 1 APPLY FOR
14. THERE ARE OPPORTUNITIES AT THIS ACTIVITY FOR SELF DEVELOPMENT AND IMPROVEMENT
15. DISCIPLINARY MEASURES, WHEN TAKEN AT THIS ACTIVITY, ARE FAIR AND WITHIN REASON
16. I HAVE JUST AS GOOD A CHANCE OF GETTING AHEAD AS ANY OTHER EMPLOYEE HERE
17. MY SUPERVISOR KEEPS ME PRETTY WELL INFORMED OF HOW I AM DOING MY JOB
18. I DO TOO MUCH LOWER LEVEL WORK THAT SHOULD BE GIVEN OTHERS TO DO
19. WE NEED AN EMPLOYEE GROUP OR OTHER ORGANIZATION TO PROTECT OUR RIGHTS
20. | WOULD MIND WORKING FOR A SUPERVISOR WHO IS A MEMBER OF A MINORITY GROUP
21. MEDICAL AND HEALTH FACILITIES ARE ACCEPTABLE
22. I CAN GET HELP FROM MY SUPERVISOR WHENEVER I NEED IT .
23. THE PAY FOR MY JOB IS ABOUT RIGHT FOR THE WORK 1 DO
24. PROMOTIONS USUALLY GO TO THE BEST QUALIFIED
25. I HAVE RECEIVED ALL THE TRAINING I NEED TO DO MY JOB
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Answer all Questions on This Page in C O I . Z -i>
Line up this bar with bar on answer sheet
26. MY SUPERVISOR ENCOURAGES ME TO SUBMIT BENEFICIAL SUGGESTIONS
27. I KNOW WHEN AND WHERE THERE ARE JOB OPENINGS THAT I MAY APPLY EOR AT THIS ACTIVITY . .
28. EVERYONE DOES HIS FAIR SHARE OF THE WORK IN MY UNIT
29. UNION MEMBERS ARE TREATED THE SAME AS NON-UNION MEMBERS
30. AS FAR AS JOB OPPORTUNITIES ARE CONCERNED. MEN AND WOMEN ARE TREATED THE SAME ....
31. I AM FREE TO DISCUSS WORK IMPROVEMENTS WITH MY SUPERVISOR
32. MY PAY IS FAIR COMPARED TO THE PAY OTHERS ARE GETTING
33. I AM TOLD PROMPTLY WHEN THERE IS A CHANGE IN POLICY. RULES
OR REGULATIONS THAT AFFECT ME
34. THIS PLACE WOULD RUN BETTER IF IT WERE ORGANIZED DIFFERENTLY
35. TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES ARE OK :
36. I HAVE FREEDOM TO DO THINGS MY OWN WAY. WITHIN REASON
37. I THINK THEY LEAN OVER BACKWARDS TO GIVE MINORITY GROUP MEMBERS ALL THE BREAKS . . .
38. I HAVE A CHANCE TO MAKE MY VIEWS KNOWN BEFORE CHANGES ARE MADE THAT AFFECT ME
39. I UNDERSTAND HOW MY JOB FITS INTO THE WORK OF THIS ACTIVITY
40. MEMBERS OF MINORITY GROUPS ARE TREATED FAIRLY AT THIS ACTIVITY
41. BULLETIN BOARDS KEEP ME INFORMED OF THINGS I NEED TO KNOW
42. THE TITLE OF MY JOB IS ABOUT RIGHT FOR THE WORK I DO
43. GETTING TRAINING IS IMPORTANT IF YOU WANT TO BE PROMOTED
44. I AGREE WITH THE LAST PERFORMANCE RATING I RECEIVED
45. I USUALLY CAN TAKE LEAVE WHEN I WANT IT
46. I AM SATISFIED WITH THE PROGRESS I HAVE MADE AT THIS ACTIVITY
47. THE TRAINING I HAVE RECEIVED AT THIS ACTIVITY HAS HELPED ME ADVANCE
48. I GENERALLY KNOW WHAT IS GOING ON AT THIS ACTIVITY
49. I AM FREE TO JOIN A UNION IF I WANT TO '
50. 1 KNOW HOW THE PAY FOR MY JOB IS SET
51.1 KNOW HOW TO GLT MY CLASSIFICATION REVIEWED
56

Answer All Questions on This Page in C O I . 3 £^*-
Line up this bar with bar on answer sheet
52. I UNDERSTAND HOW THEY PICK PEOPLE EOR PROMOTION
53. I DO A LOT OF UNNECESSARY WORK
54. I KNOW WHAT I'M EXPECTED TO DO IN MY JOB
55. MY SUPERVISOR TRIES TO GET MY IDEAS ABOUT THINGS
56. I GET PERSONAL SATISFACTION FROM MY JOB
57. I AM TREATED FAIRLY AND WITH RESPECT
i
58. PARKING FACILITIES ARE SATISFACTORY
59. THE WORK I DO IS INTERESTING
60. I AM TOO CLOSELY SUPERVISED
i
61.1 KNOW THE QUALITY OF WORK EXPECTED OF ME '
62. EATING FACILITIES ARE SATISFACTORY :
63. THE WORK I DO IS IMPORTANT
»
64. I KNOW HOW MUCH WORK IS EXPECTED OF ME
I
65. I WOULD RECOMMEND THIS PLACE TO MY FRIENDS
AS A GOOD PLACE TO WORK :
E
PLEASE REMOVE ANSWER SHEET FROM BOOKLET AND COMPLETE
ITEMS UNDER "EMPLOYEE PROFILE DATA"
* U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1972 O - «9-2M
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THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION.
PLEASE RETURN THE QUESTIONNAIRE BOOKLET AND THE
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